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Abstract 
A substantive amount of lab experimental evidence suggests that the norm of reciprocity has 
important economic consequences. However, it is unclear whether the norm of reciprocity 
survives in a natural and competitive environment with experienced agents. For this purpose 
we analyze data from a natural field experiment conducted with sales representatives who 
were instructed to randomly distribute product samples as gifts to their business partners. 
We find that distributing gifts to store managers boosts sales revenue substantially, which is 
consistent with the notion of reciprocity. However, the results underline that the nature of 
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 1 Introduction
According to the norm of reciprocity people should respond to favorable treat-
ment likewise. A great amount of evidence has been gathered in lab experiments
indicating that many subjects behave consistently according to this rule. Schol-
ars propagate that reciprocity plays a crucial role in sustaining provisions to
public goods (see Fehr and G￿chter (2000a)), in facilitating the enforcement of
incomplete contracts (see Fehr et al. (1997)) and in the design of performance
incentives (see Irlenbusch and Sliwka (2005) and Fehr et al. (2007)). Moreover,
reciprocal motivations are often held responsible for downward wage rigidity and
involuntary unemployment (see Akerlof (1982) or Bewley (1999)). Despite these
important micro- and macroeconomic consequences the prevalence of social pref-
erences in naturally occurring competitive markets remains largely unexplored.1
Empirical evidence from such markets is important because the presumption that
competition crowds out pro-social behavior is prevalent among economists.2
In the present study we investigate whether the norm of reciprocity survives in
a natural and competitive environment with experienced agents. For this purpose
we analyze data from a natural ￿eld experiment3 conducted in a competitive
business-to-business context. We advise sales representatives (￿the sellers￿) from
a Swiss subsidiary of a large multinational consumer products ￿rm to randomly
distribute product samples as gifts to their business partners (￿the buyers￿) and
record their sales performance.
Our ￿eld experiment contributes to the literature in several ways. First,
buyers do not know they are taking part in an experiment. Hence, their behavior
is una￿ected by the experimenter demand e￿ect which is potentially present in
lab experiments. Moreover, the design is integrated into the daily routine of the
sellers and therefore allows them to behave naturally. Second, in contrast to
the usual student subject pool, the buyers are experienced market participants
who should be acquainted with the commonly used persuasion methods in the
sales business.4 Third, the market is highly competitive due to its saturation.
This business-to-business context should leave little room for social preferences
1A series of laboratory experiments study the relation between competition and social pref-
erences. Some studies ￿nd that competition weakens the importance of social preferences on
outcomes (e.g. Fischbacher et al. (2003), Carpenter (2005)), others ￿nd robust e￿ects (e.g.
Fehr et al. (1998)). To the best of our knowledge List (2006) performed the only natural ￿eld
experiment studying reciprocity in a competitive environment.
2E.g. see the discussions in Stigler (1981) and Bowles (1998).
3According to the taxonomy of Harrison and List (2004) a natural ￿eld experiment is an
experiment ￿...where the environment is one where the subjects naturally undertake these tasks
and where the subjects do not know that they are in an experiment (p. 1014).￿
4See Williams et al. (2004) for evidence that knowledge of persuasive intentions can reduce
the susceptibility to persuasion.
1and consequently allows for a conservative test of the economic importance of
reciprocity in natural markets.
The results are clear-cut, notwithstanding the conservative setting. We ob-
serve that the distribution of gifts helps in boosting sales revenue signi￿cantly.
Distributing a gift at the beginning of the negotiations with the store manager
increases sales revenue by on average more than 340 percent. From the seller’s
viewpoint gift giving increases the e￿ciency of her negotiations. Our results
therefore corroborate previous lab experimental results on reciprocity. However,
we also ￿nd that the occurrence of reciprocity is conditional on environmental
factors. Surprisingly, there is no indication for positive reciprocal behavior if
buyers and sellers interact for the ￿rst time.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes how the
topic of this paper relates to existing literature. In Section 3 we present the exper-
imental design and provide further background information. The experimental
results are reported in Section 4. In Section 5 we conclude with a discussion of
the results.
2 Related Literature
The bottom line of various lab experiments is that a non-negligible fraction of
people reciprocate positively and negatively to friendly or hostile actions from
other individuals even if reciprocating is costly (see Fehr and G￿chter (2000b)
for a survey). Fehr et al. (1997) argue that neglecting these reciprocal ￿...motives
may lead to wrong predictions and to wrong normative inferences (p. 833)￿.
Several models have been proposed to incorporate reciprocal motivations (see
Sobel (2005) for a survey). Natural ￿eld experiments in the labor market have
thus far provided only weak evidence for positive reciprocity in the wage-e￿ort
relationship (see Gneezy and List (2006), Kube et al. (2006), Al-Ubaydli et al.
(2006) and Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2005)).5 List (2006) compares the behavior
of the same population of sports-cards traders in both the lab and the ￿eld. He
discovers a positive correlation between o￿ered prices and product quality in the
lab. However, this link does not survive the step from the lab into the ￿eld when
quality cannot be veri￿ed. Levitt and List (2006) argue in their general review
on the relation between ￿eld and lab experiments that ￿the lack of congruence
between moral and wealth-maximizing actions can lead laboratory experiments
to yield quantitative insights that may not be readily extrapolated to the outside
5However, Kube et al. (2006) show that wage-cuts can have strong and long lasting negative
e￿ects on workers’ productivity. Bellemare and Shearer (2007) ￿nd signi￿cant short run positive
reciprocity in an experiment conducted within a tree planting ￿rm.
2world (p. 29)￿. Our paper addresses this issue and tests for positive reciprocity
in a competitive market with experienced market participants.
The distribution of free samples is a common practice among marketing prac-
titioners (e.g. see Cialdini (1985) or Brandweek (1995)). However, experimental
evidence as to the economic importance of these gifts is astonishingly meager
(Bawa and Shoemaker (2004)). Moreover, the prevailing focus lays on familiar-
ization with the product and the learning e￿ect associated with the trial of the
samples.6 In our experiment, sales are made on the spot and leave the buyer no
time for sampling the gift. Therefore we can sidestep learning e￿ects.
Finally, recent ￿eld experimental studies analyze social preferences in non-
market contexts.7 The setting most similar to this is that of Falk (forthcoming),
who ￿nds that enclosing gifts in solicitation letters provokes reciprocal behavior
in donors and therefore increases the frequency of charitable giving. In contrast
to most previous ￿eld experimental studies on social preferences this paper goes
beyond the non-market environment and focuses on a competitive setting.
3 Experimental Setup
The aim of this experiment is to identify the e￿ect of gift giving in a natural
market. This section describes the background, the experimental design and the
behavioral predictions.
Background
The ￿rm involved in our ￿eld experiment is a Swiss subsidiary of a multina-
tional consumer products producer. It operates in a saturated market that is
characterized by a high degree of competition and eroding pro￿t margins. We
collaborated with a local o￿ce consisting of ￿ve ￿eld sales representatives (￿the
sellers￿). Three sellers are males and two sellers are females. All have profound
work experience in the sales business. They work in di￿erent regions, covering
the Swiss market. Sellers receive a ￿xed wage without any explicit performance
incentives. Their customers (￿the buyers￿) are retail shops, ranging from small
independent stores to branches of large retail chains. Depending on the subjec-
6Scott (1976), Steinberg and Yalch (1978) and Lammers (1991) provide ￿eld evidence con-
cerning the impact of free samples on purchasing behavior. In one of the rare ￿eld experiments
focusing on reciprocity in the business to consumer context Strohmetz et al. (2002) ￿nd that
distributing a small piece of chocolate with the check signi￿cantly increased the tips given to
the servers in a restaurant.
7See List and Lucking-Reiley (2002), Frey and Meier (2004), Shang and Croson (2005), Eckel
and Grossman (2005) and Landry et al. (2006).
3tively assessed importance, buyers are ranked into ￿ve categories (A, B, C, D and
E) by the ￿rm.
At the design stage of the ￿eld experiment we questioned the sellers about
their sales strategies and routine. They regularly visit the buyers to present new
o￿ers and special promotions. The order of customer visits is determined by geo-
graphical proximity. They usually drop in without prior notice and try to address
the manager of the retail store. In case the manager is not present, they speak
to another member of sta￿. Often the sellers know the buyers personally but
occasionally they encounter a buyer for the ￿rst time. The sellers are equipped
with a sales booklet containing about three to ￿ve o￿ers of di￿erent products. If
a buyer wants a product, the sellers take the order using the forms in their sales
booklet. Sales meetings last an average of approximately ten minutes.
With regard to our research question we were particularly interested in one
aspect of sales strategies, namely the usage of gifts. It turned out that all sellers
distributed product samples in past business negotiations. However, gifts were
used infrequently and most importantly, they were mainly handed over after a
deal. Buyers thus should not expect to receive a gift at the beginning of a sales
meeting.
Design
Two weeks before the experiment started, the sellers attended a brie￿ng led by one
of the authors. They were informed about the fact that we intended to conduct
a scienti￿c experiment but they were not informed about our hypotheses. The
sellers were instructed not to tell the buyers that this was an experiment. We
clearly stated that the data would not be used for individual sales performance
comparisons and that all data would be anonymized.
After a short introduction into the experiment and time schedule the exper-
imental procedures were set out: The main treatment (Gift) and the control
treatment (No Gift) were allocated such that every seller had to distribute a gift
in roughly 50 percent of her sales meetings. The gifts had to be handed over
as a ￿free sample￿ right at the beginning of the sales meeting. Each seller re-
ceived a folder containing a sheet for every sales meeting. A text box containing
the instructions (i.e. depending on the current treatment, whether they should
distribute a gift or not) was placed at the upper part of each sheet. The order
of the di￿erent sheets in each seller’s folder was randomly assigned in advance.
Sellers were told to work through the folder sheet by sheet without alternating
the order. Concerning the sales pitch wording the sellers were instructed to use
their usual sales strategy and, especially, to keep it constant across treatments.
We purposely did not restrict the sellers’ behavior by using a ￿xed protocol so as
4to keep the situation as natural as possible.8 All sellers were equipped with sales
booklets containing ￿ve o￿ers and sold the same products.9
The gift was a sample of the ￿rm’s products. It contained six tubes of tooth-
paste with a total cost of 10 Swiss francs (about 7.7 US Dollars), which is slightly
more than the costs of gifts used in the past. The reason for choosing a product
sample was that it makes the treatment variation unsuspicious. The customer
would certainly have perceived a cash o￿ering or some unrelated product in a
di￿erent way. Furthermore, we wanted to use a gender-neutral gift.
In addition to the treatment instructions, the sheets also contained a ques-
tionnaire, which provides additional data for our analysis. The sellers were asked
to ￿ll out the ￿rst half of the questionnaire before the sales meetings and the
other half of the questionnaire immediately afterwards. The ￿rst half contained
questions about (i) the customer category (Category A, B, C, D or F), and (ii)
whether the buyer was visited for the ￿rst time (Firstvisit). Right after the sales
meeting the sellers had to indicate (iii) the number of o￿ers they were able to show
to the buyer (O￿ers shown), (iv) the sales revenue they actually made for each of
the ￿ve o￿ers (Sales Revenue), (v) the duration of the sales meeting (Duration),
and (vi) whether they negotiated with the store manager or not (Manager).10
The ￿nal part of the brie￿ng consisted of a practical example. In order to
acquaint all of the sellers with the procedures, each sellers was presented with a
hypothetical sales meeting situation and had to ￿ll out the questionnaire.
The sellers collected the data during the months of January and February
2006 and sent it to the authors. They were identi￿ed by a code, keeping the
anonymity of sources. In total we have observations from 220 sales meetings. 109
in the main treatment and 111 in the control treatment.
Behavioral Predictions
Should a consumer’s decision to buy depend on whether he or she receives a
gift or not? And if so, should the gift increase or decrease sales? If a buyer
perceives the negotiation with the seller as a one-shot game then, under standard
assumptions, there is no reason to take the receipt of the gift into consideration.
Yet, it is also possible that the situation is perceived as a repeated game: Buyers
could have a strategic incentive to buy more in order to increase the probability
8Our regression analysis accounts for di￿erences in selling style between the sellers by using
individual ￿xed e￿ects.
9We used several sets of sales booklets in order to test various modes of product presentation,
which were primarily in the interest of the ￿rm. However, it is important to note that our main
treatment variation (Gift) and presentational variations were perfectly orthogonal.
10Table 8 in the Appendix provides the question wording for the above variables and for some
further controls which might in￿uence the outcome of the sales meetings.
5of receiving a gift in the future.
However, due to past gift giving practices this kind of repeated game argument
is valid for both treatments. In the Gift treatment a buyer aims to increase the
probability of receiving a gift at the next visit. The fact that, from time to
time, buyers received gifts after the deal implies that they also have a strategic
incentive in treatment No Gift. Buying more might increase the probability of
receiving a gift right after the deal. Taken together, the incentive is even stronger
in the No Gift treatment, since the gift is received immediately after the deal as
opposed to somewhere in the future in case of treatment Gift (assuming that the
buyers in the Gift treatment do not expect to receive another gift after the deal).
Hence, under standard assumptions we would expect, if at all, a negative e￿ect
of the gift on sales revenue.
On the other hand, there is now ample lab evidence demonstrating the im-
portance of reciprocal behavior in gift-exchange situations (see Fehr and G￿chter
(2000b)). Receiving a gift from a seller is presumably perceived as a kind action.
In reaction, a reciprocally motivated buyer would be inclined to buy more. The
notion of reciprocity therefore predicts a positive correlation between gift giving
and sales revenues. We expect that reciprocal motivations will tempt the buyer
to return the favor when they receive a gift and predict a positive treatment
e￿ect, i.e., sales revenue will be higher in the Gift treatment than in the No Gift
treatment.
4 Results
The results are presented in three steps. First, we outline the empirical strategy.
In a second step after assessing the impact of gift giving on attention, we test
whether buyers reciprocate positively upon receiving a gift. And third, we provide
some evidence illustrating the relevance of contextual factors for the prevalence
of reciprocal behavior.
Empirical Strategy
We assess whether observable covariates are statistically similar across treatments
using Pearson’s Â2 tests for binary control variables and a Wilcoxon rank-sum
test for non-binary control variables (see Table 5 in the Appendix). With the
exception of Category E we cannot reject the null hypothesis that control vari-
ables are balanced between treatments based on conventional signi￿cance levels.
Alternatively, we estimated a Logit model with treatment status as a dependent
variable and all controls as explanatory variables. None of the coe￿cients are
signi￿cantly di￿erent from zero and joint insigni￿cance of all coe￿cients cannot
6be rejected (LR Â2(16) = 15:03, p = 0:552). In summary, the randomization
resulted in a fairly well balanced set of buyers in the two treatment conditions.
All of our regression models are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS). The baseline model for the preceding analysis takes the following linear
form:
Y = ® + ¯ ¤ Gift + ° ¤ X + ± ¤ Seller + ²;
where Y is either the total sales revenue or the number of o￿ers sold per meeting11
and Gift is the binary treatment variable. In that the error term ² is potentially
correlated within sellers, we include dummies for Seller 1 to Seller 4. In addition
to taking care of the nonstandard error term, these seller ￿xed e￿ects capture
di￿erences in selling style and past gift giving practices. We alternatively esti-
mated all models using Generalized Least Squares (GLS) with random e￿ects
speci￿cation of the error term. The results reported below are not sensitive to
this manipulation. Similarly, the main results are qualitatively robust to a Tobit
speci￿cation with bottom censoring at zero sales revenue (see Tables 6 and 7 in
the Appendix).
The variable Category E is included in all regression models as a control vari-
able X in order to account for the condition that this variable is not perfectly
balanced between treatments. Managers have potentially more authority to make
acquisition decisions than regular employees do. In order to allow for di￿erent
reactions to the gift between managers and regular employees we extend the base-
line model by including a Gift*Manager interaction term.
To Give and Take
Starting a sales meeting with a gift could a￿ect buyers’ behavior in several ways.
First, it could simply buy time. The average duration of a sales meeting is nine
minutes in the No Gift treatment and ten minutes in the Gift treatment. Given
that the act of handing over the gift is also time consuming, the net increase in
attention seems negligible.
A second measure for the buyers’ attention is the number of o￿ers a seller is
able to present (variable O￿ers shown). The sales booklet contained ￿ve o￿ers.
The average number of o￿ers shown is 3.79 in the No Gift treatment and 4.16
in the Gift treatment state. In Model (1) of Table 1 we regress O￿ers shown on
11The number of o￿ers sold is de￿ned as the number of o￿ers from which at least one unit
was sold during sales meeting. As the sales booklets contain 5 o￿ers, this variable can take
values from 0 to 5.
7the treatment dummy and the controls. The treatment variation does not signi￿-
cantly explain the increase in O￿ers shown. In Model (2) we allow for di￿erences
in the reaction to the gift between managers and regular sta￿ (Gift*Manager).
The e￿ect of the gift is augmented if the seller talks to a manager but the dif-
ference is not signi￿cant. Managers consider signi￿cantly less o￿ers than regular
workers.
In a next step we concentrate on the number of o￿ers sold. Panels (a) and
(b) in Figure 1 illustrate the in￿uence of the gift on the average number of o￿ers
sold per visit. In the full sample (Panel a) the gift has only a marginal impact
on the number of o￿ers sold. However, among the managers the e￿ect turns out
to be sizeable. The number of o￿ers sold more than doubles from 0.53 o￿ers on
average in the No Gift treatment to 1.15 in the Gift treatment (see Panel b).



































































































The regressions explaining the variable O￿ers sold (Models (3) and (4) of
Table 1) underscore these results statistically. In Model (3) the coe￿cient of
Gift has the expected positive sign but it is far from signi￿cance. Model (4)
tests for di￿erences between managers and regular employees. Gift*Manager is
8large and signi￿cant from an economic and statistical point of view (p < 0:05).
The observation that managers react to the gift but regular employees do not is
quite plausible if one considers that managers have generally more authority in
decision-making. Furthermore, regular employees may not be allowed to keep the
gift themselves.
Result 1: On average managers accept more o￿ers in the Gift treatment
than in the No Gift treatment.
Table 1: OLS Regression Results: Attention and O￿ers Sold
O￿ers Shown O￿ers Sold
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gift 0.284 0.187 0.112 -0.084





Seller FE? YES YES YES YES
Controls? YES YES YES YES
Obs. 220 220 220 220
Prob> F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: This table reports OLS coe￿cient estimates (robust standard errors in parentheses). Signi￿cance levels
are denoted as follows: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. The dependent variable is the number of o￿ers
sold in each of the negotiations. Category E is included in the set of control variables for all reported models.
So far we have shown that the gift has no dramatic e￿ect on attention but
increases the number of o￿ers sold to managers. However, the ultimately relevant
measure for assessing the success of the gift is yet missing. Our hypothesis is
that sales revenues are higher in treatment Gift compared to No Gift. Panel (c)
of Figure 1 shows that this is clearly the case. Sellers more than double their
revenue by handing out a gift. All but one seller achieved a higher sales revenue
in treatment Gift than in No Gift. A conservative Wilcoxon signed-rank test
using di￿erences between the sellers’ averages in both treatments as observations
rejects the null hypothesis that each seller has an equal sales revenue in Gift and
No Gift (one sided p-value: p = 0:040;N = 5).
Panel (d) shows that the treatment e￿ect is even more pronounced if sellers
negotiate with store managers: sales revenue increases on average by more than
340 percent. A look at the sub-sample (N = 143) of meetings with regular emp-
loyees (average sales revenue of 45.3 in Gift and 46.4 Swiss Francs in No Gift)
suggests that the treatment e￿ect in the total sample is entirely driven by the
9managers. This point can also be inferred from Models (1) and (2) of Table
2, where we explain sales revenue by the treatment variable and usual controls.
The coe￿cient is large and signi￿cant for Gift, but becomes statistically indis-
tinguishable from zero as soon as the Gift*Manager interaction term is included.
Gift*Manager on the other hand is signi￿cant and large: presenting a gift to
the manager increases sales revenue on average by 187 Swiss Francs (Gift and
Gift*Manager).
Does the increase in sales revenue make it worthwhile for the ￿rm to use the
gift? In the whole sample revenue increases on average by 65 Swiss Francs due
to the gift. Whether this makes the gift pro￿table or not depends on the ￿rm’s
pro￿t margin. Given the cost of 10 Swiss Francs for the gift, a pro￿t margin as
low as 16 percent would su￿ce to make the gift on average pro￿table. We do
not have exact information about the pro￿t margin, but according to personal
communication with the ￿rm we know that it surpasses this threshold. When
dealing with a manager the coe￿cient estimates add up to 187 Swiss Francs.
A pro￿t margin of 5.4 percent would thus su￿ce for the ￿rm to break even.
Assuming a pro￿t margin of 25 percent, the gift generates four times more pro￿t
than it costs. Moreover the lower bound of the 95 percent con￿dence interval for
Gift*Manager is 28,9 Swiss Francs, which is well above the cost of the gift. Taken
together, the results show that the gift increases the e￿ciency of sales meetings
substantially.
Result 2: The gift has a positive in￿uence on sales revenue. The increase in
generated revenue is large enough to make it worthwhile for the ￿rm to use the
gift. The e￿ect is driven by the sales meetings with the managers, among whom
the use of the gift is highly pro￿table.
Is the increase in revenue solely driven by the fact that the gift increases the
number of o￿ers sold? Comparing revenue between treatments conditional on
that at least one product was sold (see Panel (e) of Figure 1) reveals a substan-
tial treatment e￿ect. The regression results in Model (3) of Table 2 show that,
compared to the No Gift treatment, revenue is on average 156 Swiss Francs higher
in the Gift treatment given that sellers have made a deal.12 Hence, the treatment
e￿ects in the unconditional sample are not exclusively driven by a higher sales
probability in Gift.
As described at the beginning of this section gift giving slightly, though in-
signi￿cantly, increases buyers’ attention. Greater attention might be responsible
for the observed treatment e￿ects. O￿ers shown is included in Model (4) and
12In Model (3) Manager, Wholesaler 3 and Male are included as additional control variables
as they are not perfectly balanced between treatments in the restricted sample, according to a
Pearson’s Â2 test.
10Table 2: OLS Regression Results: Sales Revenue
Sales Revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gift 65.097** 1.811 156.405** 59.794** -3.116
(30.147) (17.268) (76.258) (28.773) (17.837)
Gift*Manager 185.233** 177.522**
(79.325) (76.588)
Manager 19.763 119.607 38.285
(24.866) ) (101.896) (27.612)
O￿ers shown 18.673** 26.374**
(8.024) (10.390)
Seller FE? YES YES YES YES YES
Controls? YES YES YES YES YES
Obs. 220 220 73 220 220
Prob> F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: This table reports OLS coe￿cient estimates (robust standard errors in parentheses). Signi￿cance levels
are denoted as follows: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. The dependent variable is sales revenue in Swiss
Francs achieved per negotiation. Model (3) is based on the sub-sample of observations with a positive revenue.
Category E is included in the set of control variables for all reported models. In Model (3) Manager, Wholesaler
3 and Male are included as additional control variables as they are not perfectly balanced between treatments
in the restricted sample.
(5) of Table 2 in order to isolate the impact of the gift from attention e￿ects.
Although the coe￿cient of O￿ers shown is signi￿cant, the coe￿cient estimates
for both, Gift and Gift*Manager, are robust to this speci￿cation. Hence, gifts
in￿uence the sellers’ success independent of attention.
Result 3: Conditional on that at least one product is sold the sellers ob-
tain a substantially higher sales revenue in the Gift treatment than in the No
Gift treatment. The e￿ect of the gift remains strong when taking attention into
account.
The First Time
Sellers often know their customers personally from earlier visits. In some of the
sales meetings they talk to buyers they do not know. Our questionnaire data
allows us to distinguish between these two cases. Much to our surprise, the
variable Firstvisit proves to be a very decisive factor in our treatment e￿ect.
The gift is counterproductive and tends to lower sales revenue in situations
(N = 82) where customers and sellers do not know each other: while the average
revenue in the No Gift treatment is 23.5 Swiss Francs, it is only half the size in
the Gift treatment (11.1 Swiss Francs). The regression results from Model (1)

















Seller FE? YES YES
Controls? YES YES
Obs. 220 220
Prob> F 0.000 0.000
Note: This table reports OLS coe￿cient estimates (robust standard errors in parentheses). Signi￿cance levels
are denoted as follows: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. The dependent variable is sales revenue in Swiss
Francs achieved in each of the negotiations. Category E is included in the set of control variables.
in Table 3 demonstrate a similar picture: the coe￿cient of the Gift*Firstvisit
interaction term is signi￿cantly negative. Adding up the coe￿cient estimates for
Gift and Gift*Firstvisit yields a negative net gift exchange e￿ect. However, the
di￿erence is statistically insigni￿cant (Wald test: F=1.92, p=0.167).
Model (2) shows that, like above, the e￿ect is mainly driven by the meetings
with managers. The signi￿cant three-way interaction between Gift, Firstvisit
and Manager suggests that the negative ￿rst-time e￿ect is especially strong in
sales meetings with managers.13 Hence, customers do not buy more in the Gift
treatment if they do not know the giver.14
Result 4: The positive e￿ect of the gift on sales revenue vanishes if sellers
and buyers do not know each other from previous interactions.
13Gift*Firstvisit*Manager is negative but becomes insigni￿cant with a Tobit speci￿cation of
the latter regression model. See Table 7 in the Appendix.
14One seller was newly hired during the period of the experiment and therefore did not know
any of the buyers personally. This seller’s revenue is on average lower in Gift than in No Gift.
As mentioned above, the opposite holds true for all other sellers. The results are robust to the
exclusion of observations stemming from this newly hired seller.
125 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
We analyzed data from a natural ￿eld experiment testing the importance of reci-
procity in a competitive market with experienced agents. Sales representatives
from a multinational consumer products ￿rm were instructed to randomly dis-
tribute a gift to their business partners. Consistent with the notion of reciprocity,
gifts increased the sellers’ success in sales substantially, especially if they were
handed over to the manager of the store. This result is remarkable given that the
literature on gift-exchange has recently been challenged by studies showing that
reciprocal behavior is of lesser importance in more naturally occurring settings
(e.g. Gneezy and List (2006), List (2006)). Furthermore, there is some evidence
that competition tends to reduce social preferences (Carpenter (2005)), or dimin-
ishes the impact of social preferences on the outcome (Fischbacher et al. (2003)).
The customers in our experiment are observed in a natural and highly competi-
tive setting. We therefore consider our result strong evidence for the signi￿cance
of reciprocal behavior.
However, our results also indicate that the prevalence of reciprocity is con-
ditional on environmental factors. If sellers and buyers meet for the ￿rst time
and therefore do not know each other, no reciprocal behavior is observable. In
contrast, the gift is rather counterproductive and hinders the sellers’ success in
sales. One potential explanation for this phenomenon is that the nature of the
relationship determines how buyers interpret the receipt of gifts and the under-
lying intentions. Given that seller and buyer know each other the gift can be
interpreted as a gesture of friendship. On the other hand, unfamiliar buyers may
become suspicious and consider the gift as a persuasive attempt to push sales
or even as a bribe. Trawick et al. (1989) conducted a survey among purchasing
agents and found that gifts are considered to be less ethical and to negatively
a￿ect supplier choice if they are distributed to prospective instead of current
customers. Another potential explanation for the absence of reciprocal behavior
relates to the concept of social distance (e.g. see Ho￿man et al. (1996) or Char-
ness et al. (2007)). Buyers might perceive the social distance to be greater when
dealing with an unknown customer and therefore feel less indebted to recipro-
cate.15
This study focused on short run e￿ects of gift giving. An interesting next
step is to look at the role of intertemporal substitution and the role of adapta-
tion in repeated gift giving. If the buyers in the Gift decrease their expenditures
15Interestingly, Bellemare and Shearer (2007) ￿nd that reciprocal behavior is more pro-
nounced in their labor market ￿eld experiment, as the workers’ tenure increases. It therefore
seems that the interaction between the giver-responder relationship and reciprocal motivation
is not restricted to the speci￿c setting of this paper.
13in subsequent sales talks, the long term e￿ect of the gift might be zero. While
our data does not allow to test this argument the results from Falk (forthcom-
ing) and Bellemare and Shearer (2007) suggest that intertemporal substitution
is unimportant for reciprocal behavior. Other contextual factors not analyzed
in this paper might be of crucial importance for the prevalence of reciprocity
in the ￿eld. Such factors include for example the nature and value of the gift.
Buyers would surely interpret 10 Swiss Francs in cash di￿erently than the six
tubes of tooth paste. The di￿erent nature of gifts might also account for the
mixed ￿ndings from recent ￿eld experiments. In fact our results are in line with
Falk (forthcoming), where a non-monetary gift is distributed, but di￿er from List
(2006), where the ￿rst mover’s gift is just cash. Hence, the absence of reciprocal
behavior in the ￿eld does not necessarily mean that people are not motivated by
reciprocity. It might just be due to the fact that the receiver does not perceive
the gift as a kind action. Analyzing the ￿currency￿ of reciprocity is an important
task for future research.
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17Appendix
Table 4: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Sales Revenue 88.445 244.676 0 2196
O￿ers Sold 0.555 0.932 0 4
Duration 9.523 8.131 0 50
O￿ers shown 3.973 1.404 0 5
Manager 0.35 0.478 0 1
Category A 0.055 0.228 0 1
Category B 0.205 0.404 0 1
Category C 0.409 0.493 0 1
Category D 0.059 0.236 0 1
Category E 0.273 0.446 0 1
Wholesaler 1 0.618 0.487 0 1
Wholesaler 2 0.109 0.312 0 1
Wholesaler 3 0.273 0.446 0 1
Shopping mall 0.286 0.453 0 1
# Visits 1.973 2.532 0 13
Firstvisit .373 .485 0 1
January 0.495 0.501 0 1
Male 0.255 0.437 0 1
Seller 1 0.059 0.236 0 1
Seller 2 0.227 0.42 0 1
Seller 3 0.405 0.492 0 1
Seller 4 0.264 0.442 0 1
Seller 5 0.045 0.209 0 1
Obs. 220
18Table 5: Assessing the Balance of Covariates
Variable Gift No Gift p-value
Category A 0.064 0.045 0.531
(0.246) (0.208)
Category B 0.229 0.18 0.366
(0.422) (0.386)
Category C 0.45 0.369 0.227
(0.5) (0.485)
Category D 0.064 0.054 0.749
(0.246) (0.227)
Category E 0.193 0.351 0.008
(0.396) (0.48)
Wholesaler 1 0.624 0.613 0.864
(0.487) (0.489)
Wholesaler 2 0.138 0.081 0.179
(0.346) (0.274)
Wholesaler 3 0.239 0.306 0.259
(0.428) (0.463)
Shopping mall 0.294 0.279 0.815
(0.458) (0.451)
Manager 0.358 0.342 0.81
(0.482) (0.477)
Male 0.284 0.225 0.314
(0.453) (0.42)
Firstvisit 0.367 0.378 0.861
(0.484) (0.487)
# Visits 2.22 1.73 0.243
(2.773) (2.256)
January 0.505 0.486 0.788
(0.502) (0.502)
Seller 1 0.064 0.054 0.749
(0.246) (0.227)
Seller 2 0.229 0.225 0.942
(0.422) (0.42)
Seller 3 0.376 0.432 0.395
(0.487) (0.498)
Seller 4 0.284 0.243 0.488
(0.453) (0.431)
Seller 5 0.046 0.045 0.977
(0.21) (0.208)
Note: Sample averages (and standard deviations in parentheses) are reported in the ￿rst two
columns. The last column contains p-values (two sided Pearsons’s Â2 tests respectively Wilcoxon
ranksum tests for the non-binary control variable # visits) for the null hypothesis of perfect
randomization.
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